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Retaliation and Requesting
Religious Accommodation
Charles A. Sullivan†
Abstract
A recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision on an issue of
first impression suggests that requests for reasonable accommodations
of religious practices or observances are generally not protected conduct
within the scope of § 704, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision. The
court reasoned that such a request does not fall within that provision’s
“opposition” clause because it did not “oppose” anything the employee
could have reasonably believed was discriminatory.
This counterintuitive holding suggests to employees that accom–
modation requests are perilous, and thus threatens Title VII’s goal of
requiring employers to reasonably accommodate believers. It is true
that Supreme Court precedent protects an employee when the employer
must grant his or her accommodation because it is reasonable and does
not cause an undue hardship on the employer. In such cases, retaliating
against the employee is viewed as core religious discrimination, which
is prohibited under § 703, and so there is no need to invoke § 704.
But what if the accommodation is not legally required under Title
VII? That is a very common scenario given the Supreme Court’s
longstanding and extraordinarily narrow reading of the duty of accom–
modation under the statute. And if the Eighth Circuit’s view were to
be generally adopted, employers would seem to be largely free not
merely to deny the request but also to take adverse employment actions
against those foolish enough to make one.
This Article analyzes the complicated interaction between § 703’s
accommodation command and § 704’s retaliation prohibition. In the
process, it rejects the “no harm, no foul” argument sometimes made:
that denying employment to or firing a worker who seeks an “unreas–
onable accommodation” is not actionable because the worker will not
perform the job requirements in any event. Such a view is predicated
on the false notion that employees can seek accommodations only when
they are faced with the choice between their religion and their job. In
many cases, believers seek accommodations when their religion encour–
ages (or discourages) but does not mandate (or prohibit) the conduct
in question, a point that is often unappreciated.
The Article concludes that the Eighth Circuit was wrong in its
reading of § 704 as applied to requests for accommodation. Further, it
†
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argues that, regardless of the correct reading of that provision, taking
adverse action against a worker whose accommodation request was
legitimately denied may violate § 703’s prohibition of status discrim–
ination, a question not answered by the Eighth Circuit.
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Introduction
Long before the Americans with Disabilities Act1 (“ADA”) required
employers to accommodate disabilities, Title VII created exactly that
duty for religion.2 As amended in 1972,3 § 701(j) defined religion (an
undefined protected category in the original 1964 enactment) to
“includ[e] all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate [such] religious observance or practice without undue
hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”4 Almost twenty

1.

42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012).

2.

Rather than being framed as a separate duty, the reasonable-accom–
modation requirement was “incorporated into the statute, somewhat awk–
wardly, in the definition of religion.” See Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v.
Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986).

3.

Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (1972).

4.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2 (2018). The
amendment was largely a response to the Supreme Court affirming the
Sixth Circuit’s rejection of an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) regulation requiring a religious-accommodation
duty under Title VII. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp.
709, 714 (W.D. Mich. 1969), rev’d, 429 F.2d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 1970), aff’d
by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam). The
section’s legislative history demonstrates a desire on the part of its Senate
sponsor, Senator Jennings Randolph (himself a Seventh-Day Baptist), to
reduce the incidences of believers’ forced choices between faith and
employment. See Roberto L. Corrada, Toward an Integrated Disparate
Treatment and Accommodation Framework for Title VII Religion Cases,
77 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1411, 1427–31 (2009); Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall:
The Employer’s Duty to Accommodate Employee Religious Practices
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years later, the ADA imposed a similar duty by prohibiting discrim–
ination on the basis of disability and defining discrimination to include
failing to make reasonable accommodations for qualified individuals
with a disability.5
Title VII’s duty of accommodation, however, has been far less
robust than its ADA analog,6 and certainly less robust than its
statutory language suggests. Indeed, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison,7 the Court read the “undue hardship” exception to largely
swallow the accommodation rule.8 The case involved a Saturday
Sabbatarian who asked that a shift schedule requiring Saturday work
be modified to accommodate his beliefs.9 He proposed a number of
alternatives, but the Court found each to involve an “undue hardship”
under a remarkably deferential definition: “[t]o require TWA to bear
more than a de minimis cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is
Under Title VII after Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 50 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 513, 534 n.70 (1989).
5.

The Act defines discrimination to include:
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical
or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered
entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered
entity; or
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or
employee who is an otherwise qualified individual with a
disability, if such denial is based on the need of such covered
entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or
mental impairments of the employee or applicant.
42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5) (2012).

6.

See Nicole Buonocore Porter, A New Look at the ADA’s Undue Hardship
Defense, 84 Mo. L. Rev. 121, 126 (2019). Professor Porter reports that
the ADA’s legislative history contains explicit language rejecting the
standard in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
Porter, supra, at 126 n.36. For example, the Senate Report states:
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977) are not applicable to this legislation. In Hardison, the
Supreme Court concluded that under [T]itle VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate persons
with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more
than a de minimis cost for the employer.
S. Rep. No. 101-116, at 36 (1989); see also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt.
4, at 46 (1990).

7.

432 U.S. 63 (1977).

8.

See infra Part II.

9.

Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67–68.
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an undue hardship.”10 While this Article explores the Court’s reasons
for such an antitextual reading,11 Hardison’s restrictive approach to
religious accommodations continues to govern Title VII cases.12 Never–
theless, Title VII’s duty is not without teeth. A number of decisions
have held in the employee’s favor.13 Indeed, a recent case made
headlines when a jury awarded a hotel dishwasher twenty-one million
dollars in damages for being required to work on Sundays.14 Although
statutory caps will prevent most of that from ever being collected,15 the
verdict sends a message to employers to take requests for accom–
modation seriously.
Yet at roughly the same time the media was relaying that news,
employers were receiving another, more nuanced message from the
judiciary that seemed to free employers to retaliate against workers
seeking accommodations. In EEOC v. North Memorial Health Care,16 a
10.

Id. at 84.

11.

See infra notes 82–86 and accompanying text.

12.

Four justices, concurring in a recent denial of certiorari, hinted at a
willingness to revisit Hardison. See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139
S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (noting that, in Hardison, “the Court opined that
Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of religion does not
require an employer to make any accommodation that imposes more than
a de minimis burden. In this case, however, we have not been asked to
revisit [that] decision[].”). A petition for certiorari raising that exact issue
is pending in Patterson v. Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir.
2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-349, Sept. 17, 2018; and, of course,
four justices are sufficient to grant it. See Patterson v. Walgreen Co.,
SCOTUSblog, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/pattersonv-walgreen-co/ [https://perma.cc/6QV4-Y9GE] (last visited Dec. 17,
2019).

13.

See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.

14.

Janelle Griffith, Hotel Dishwasher Awarded $21 Million After Boss Made
Her Work on Sundays, NBC News (Jan. 17, 2019, 9:13 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/hotel-dishwasher-awarded-21-millionafter-boss-made-her-work-n959401 [https://perma.cc/C96X-R4N2].

15.

Title VII originally did not authorize the recovery of damages; rather it
provided only for equitable relief, including backpay. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a (2012) (authorizing damages in disparate treatment Title VII
cases after the Civil Rights Act of 1991); see also id. § 1981a(c) (including
the right to a jury trial when damages are sought in disparate treatment
Title VII cases). Although § 1981a describes compensatory damages
broadly—i.e., as “future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other
nonpecuniary losses”—it caps both compensatory and punitive damages
at between $50,000 and $300,000, depending on the employer’s size. Id.
§ 1981a(b)(3). Those caps are not applicable to Title VII equitable relief,
such as “backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief
authorized under section 706(g).” Id. § 1981a(b)(2).

16.

908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018).
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divided panel of the Eighth Circuit considered whether a request for a
religious accommodation was protected under § 704(a)’s prohibition of
retaliation for “opposing” discrimination.17 The majority rejected the
claim that such requests are generally protected activity, essentially
because such requests do not “oppose” anything.18 Therefore, the
hospital had not retaliated when it rescinded a conditional employment
offer after concluding it could not grant a requested accommodation.19
Of course, the employer could have been correct or incorrect in its
conclusion that it need not accommodate in the circumstances. If it
were wrong, that is, if the requested accommodation was “reasonable”
and not an “undue hardship,” the employer would have violated
§ 703(a)’s bar on discrimination on the basis of religion20 and there
would be no need for a retaliation claim. If it were right, however, no
§ 703 status-discrimination claim would lie, but a retaliation claim
under § 704 might be plausible, North Memorial notwithstanding. At
first glance, this seems odd: if the applicant would not have worked
without accommodation, she is being turned down for inability to
perform the job, not for requesting accommodation. But that assumes
that accommodations are sought only by those whose religion bars them
from working without them, which both oversimplifies religious beliefs
and misreads the statute. In North Memorial itself, the applicant had
indicated she would have worked without the requested accom–
modation.21 In such situations, a retaliation claim may be critical to
furthering Congress’s accommodation requirement.
To understand the problem, it is critical to appreciate that the
typical way an employer learns of the need for an accommodation is by
the employee requesting one (which is generally also true for ADA
accommodations).22 Nor is this unreasonable since inquiring into an
17.

Id. at 1102. This was the first circuit court to address the question at
length. Six years before North Memorial, the Seventh Circuit had assumed
that requesting a religious accommodation is protected from retaliation.
See Porter v. City of Chicago, 700 F.3d 944, 957 (7th Cir. 2012). Several
district courts take the same stance as the Seventh Circuit. See e.g., Lewis
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 12 F. Supp. 3d 418, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).

18.

North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103.

19.

See infra notes 94–108 and accompanying text.

20.

See infra notes 45–49 and accompanying text.

21.

North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1100.

22.

U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n Interpretive Guidance on Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9, at 421
(2018) (stating that it is generally “the responsibility of the individual
with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is
needed”). Such a default rule makes sense in light of the statute’s explicit
bar on inquiry into disabilities. See Kobus v. Coll. of Saint Scholastica,
Inc., 608 F.3d 1034, 1038–39 (8th Cir. 2010) (affirming that an employee
who did not reveal his treatment for depression and whose limitations
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employee’s religious beliefs violates current privacy norms and raises
the potential for discrimination claims, should an adverse action follow.
Further, there are myriad religions with differing beliefs and practices23
and different observances even among those who nominally share a
particular faith.24 Accordingly, to trigger any duty, the employee must
normally alert her employer of her desire for an accommodation because
her belief or observance conflicts with a workplace requirement.25
Given the centrality of such requests to the statutory scheme, it is
scarcely surprising that requests for accommodation have been routine–
ly held to be protected conduct under the ADA.26 One paragraph of the
relevant ADA antiretaliation provision tracks the language of Title
VII,27 and most courts have read it to protect requests for accom–

were not apparent at work had no failure-to-accommodate claim when he
was fired for excessive absenteeism resulting from the depression).
Yet because the ADA addresses accommodating “known” disabilities, 42
U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2012), there are a few cases suggesting employers
should act even absent an employee’s request when the employer
otherwise “knows” about the difficulty the disabled employee faces. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 795–
96 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a wheelchair-bound employee is not
required to request specific accommodations to trigger employer duty).
The EEOC’s interpretive guidance also notes that “[i]f an employee with
a known disability is having difficulty performing his or her job, an
employer may inquire whether the employee is in need of a reasonable
accommodation.” 29 C.F.R. app § 1630.9, at 421 (2018). This seems to
permit, but not require, an inquiry, thus leaving the ball squarely in the
worker’s court.
23.

See Dallan F. Flake, Interactive Religious Accommodation, 71 Ala. L.
Rev. 67, 71–72 (2019).

24.

See, e.g., Pielech v. Massasoit Greyhound, Inc., 668 N.E.2d 1298 (Mass.
1996) (regarding a conflict between particular Catholics’ beliefs and
official Catholic Church dogma).

25.

Accordingly, courts frequently spoke in these terms about plaintiff’s prima
facie, failure-to-accommodate case. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,
Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1575 (7th Cir. 1996) (“In order to establish a prima
facie case of religious discrimination, a plaintiff must show that the
observance or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is
religious in nature, that she called the religious observance or practice to
her employer’s attention, and that the religious observance or practice
was the basis for her discharge or other discriminatory treatment.”). The
status of a failure-to-accommodate case is discussed in Part I infra.

26.

See infra note 37.

27.

42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012) (“No person shall discriminate against any
individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”).
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modation, despite the textual obstacle North Memorial raised.28 But the
issue of whether requests are protected conduct may be less important
under the ADA than under Title VII since another paragraph of the
ADA bars coercing, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with the
exercises of ADA rights,29 a provision which has no parallel in Title VII.
It seems likely that retaliation for requesting an accommodation would
interfere with the employee’s ADA right to such an accommodation.30
And there lies the problem. Section 704(a) of Title VII bars
employer retaliation against an employee or applicant either “[(1)]
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or [(2)] because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”31
According to North Memorial, that language does not embrace an
applicant who is denied a job because she requested an accommodation
for her religious observance.32 First, the individual in question had not
filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) or otherwise fallen within the “participation” clause of the
paragraph. Second, her request could not be viewed as “opposition” to
any employment practice that was either illegal under Title VII or
reasonably perceived to be illegal. Thus, a plain textual reading of the
statute meant that employers are free to retaliate against those who
request religious accommodations.33
28.

See infra notes 126–132 and accompanying text.

29.

42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012) (“It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate,
threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of,
or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise
or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter.”).

30.

See Willis v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 12 C 07662, 2015 WL 3859191, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2015) (noting that although defendant’s argument
that requesting accommodation is not protected conduct under § 12203(a)
“might be technically correct,” § 12203(b) protects such requests); see
also Kirkeberg v. Canadian Pac. Ry., 619 F.3d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 2010)
(questioning how the ADA rule can be squared with the text of
§ 12203(a)).

31.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012).

32.

EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018).

33.

Given the “interference” clause in the ADA, a textual argument against
protecting disability-accommodation requests is more difficult to make
out but not impossible: It could be claimed that, while a discharge for
seeking such an accommodation would be “interference,” it would not
interfere with “any right granted or protected by this chapter” unless the
individual actually was due an accommodation; otherwise, it would not
interfere with “any right granted or protected by this chapter.” See 42
U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2012).
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An important qualification is necessary here. As discussed below,
refusing to hire an applicant because of the need to make a required
accommodation (that is, a reasonable accommodation that is not an
undue hardship) would violate Title VII’s prohibition of religious disc–
rimination in § 703.34 Thus, it will make little difference whether an
applicant has a claim under § 703 or § 704 when an employer refuses
to hire a person because it would be required to accommodate her.
However, where the request for accommodation could be legally
denied, § 703 is arguably not implicated, and North Memorial suggests
the employer is largely free to retaliate against the applicant or
employee under § 704.35 And, given the weak version of the duty to
accommodate under Title VII, that is far more likely to be true under
that statute than under the ADA.36 In short, North Memorial poses a
serious disincentive to employees seeking religious accommodations.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the duty not to
discriminate on the basis of religion under Title VII as developed by
the Supreme Court most recently in EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch
Stores, Inc.37 Part II explores the North Memorial holding that requests
for accommodation are not generally protected conduct. Finally, Part
III takes a fresh look at the problem. It concludes that, whether or not
North Memorial is correct on the § 704 issue it decided, a correct
reading of Title VII would make illegal a refusal to hire because of a
request for an accommodation.

34.

And, as discussed, the ADA expressly so provides. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5) (2012).

35.

One might argue that the employer should not be allowed to effectively
pretermit any accommodation analysis even under § 703. Even if, after
the fact, it does not appear that any duty has been breached, it may be
that the employer should be required to explore possible accommodations,
especially given that there may be some adjustments that the employee
can make. See Flake, supra note 23, at 71 (urging recognition of an
interactive process for religious-accommodation claims under Title VII).
However, not only have the courts not generally required an interactive
process under Title VII, but even under the ADA they have generally
refused to hold employers liable for simply failing to engage in the
interactive process required under the ADA unless there is a showing that
a reasonable accommodation was available. E.g., McBride v. BIC
Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92, 97, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2009) (finding
that because the plaintiff “provided no evidence that there existed any
potential accommodation that would have allowed her to continue to
work,” the employer’s failure to engage in interactive process was not a
violation); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (2018).

36.

See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text.

37.

135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).
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I. The Duty Not to Discriminate on the Basis of
Religion
For most of its history, Title VII’s prohibition of religious discrim–
ination was generally understood to give rise to two separate theories
of liability.38 The first, discrimination simpliciter, was essentially
disparate treatment on the basis of religion, which tracked similar
claims for race or sex discrimination.39 These cases were typically
pursued under the McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green litigation
structure,40 but are presumably also analyzed under the “motivating
factor” standard after the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendments.41 In
either case, the typical question is whether the employee or applicant
suffered an adverse employment action motivated at least in part by
the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and practices.42 As in the vast majority
of individual disparate-treatment cases, the central question is almost
always whether the challenged adverse action was taken because of
religion or for some other reason.43 More favorable treatment of compar–
ators is often a critical element of proof.44
The second theory of liability was failure to accommodate. In these
cases, the applicant or employee is denied a requested accommodation.45
In this setting, there is no inquiry into the employer’s intent; the only
issue, typically, is whether there is a reasonable accommodation avail–
able and, if so, whether it would nevertheless have been an undue

38.

See Corrada, supra note 4, at 1412–13 (“[M]ost judges, lawyers, legal
academics, and law students come to understand that most, if not all,
religious discrimination claims are divided into either discrimination/bias
cases or accommodation cases. To determine the result in any given
religious discrimination case, one must simply choose the appropriate case
category (discrimination or accommodation) and then follow the required
analytical path.”) (footnotes omitted).

39.

See, e.g., Chaplin v. Du Pont Advance Fiber Sys., 293 F. Supp. 2d 622,
629 (E.D. Va. 2003).

40.

411 U.S. 792 (1973). The litigation structure of such cases is a familiar
one designed to determine whether the adverse employment action at
issue was the result of employer bias or a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason. Id. at 802. See generally Charles A. Sullivan & Michael J.
Zimmer, Cases and Materials on Employment Discrimination 14–
24 (2017).

41.

See infra note 150 and accompanying text.

42.

See, e.g., Ali v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 8 F. App’x 156, 159 (4th Cir. 2001).

43.

See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Disc–
rimination by Comparators, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 191, 198–99 (2009).

44.

Id. at 198.

45.

See Corrada, supra note 4, at 1413–14.
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hardship to require the employer to provide it.46 More favored compar–
ators were largely unnecessary (although accommodating others might
be relevant to the proposed accommodation’s reasonableness and
undercut a claim of undue hardship). Indeed, it is the plaintiff who asks
to be preferred to other workers in the sense of being exempted from
normal workplace rules for religious reasons.47
This bifurcated litigation structure not only made some sense, given
the different proof paths taken by the two distinct claims, but it was
essentially the structure under the ADA.48 Regardless, the distinction
was questioned by the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Aber–
crombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.49 Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of
the Court, and he started by positing that Title VII “prohibits a
prospective employer from refusing to hire an applicant in order to
avoid accommodating a religious practice that it could accommodate
without undue hardship.”50 The precise question before the Court was
“whether this prohibition applies only where an applicant has informed
the employer of his need for an accommodation.”51 The Court held that
it did not.
There, Samantha Elauf applied for a sales job at an Abercrombie
& Fitch store. Elauf is a practicing Muslim and she wore her headscarf
to her job interview.52 The store’s assistant manager thought Elauf was
qualified for the job, but she was concerned that Elauf’s headscarf

46.

Some claims also involve issues about whether the request was religiously
motivated to begin with, e.g., Friedman v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp.,
125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that veganism is a
secular philosophy, not a religion); whether the requesting employee was
sincere, see infra note 161; or whether the religion required the accom–
modation, see infra note 157.

47.

See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of
Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360–61 (3rd Cir. 1999).

48.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2012); see also, e.g., Hunt v. Monro Muffler
Brake, Inc., 769 F. App’x 253, 258 (6th Cir. 2019) (“To establish a prima
facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is
disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified for
the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) his employer
knew or had reason to know about his disability; (4) he requested an
accommodation; and (5) the employer failed to provide the necessary
accommodation.”).

49.

135 S. Ct. 2028 (2015).

50.

Id. at 2031. Notice that this framing does not address the question of
whether an employer violates the statute when it refuses to hire an
individual whose religious practices it is not required to accommodate.
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.

51.

Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031.

52.

Id.
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conflicted with the store’s dress code.53 Ultimately concluding that it
did, the district manager refused to hire Elauf. She had never mentioned
her faith and she did not request any accommodation related to her
religion; nor did the manager confirm with Elauf that she wore the
headscarf for religious reasons.54
The Court rejected Abercrombie’s contention that a showing of
disparate treatment required the employer to have “actual knowledge”
of an applicant’s need for an accommodation.55 “Instead, an applicant
need only show that his need for an accommodation was a motivating
factor in the employer’s decision.”56 That was because Title VII bars
failure-to-hire because of an applicant’s religion, and religion includes
religious practice. Thus, Abercrombie refused to hire Elauf because of
her religious practices, and that was true regardless of Abercrombie’s
actual knowledge of those practices: “[A]n employer who acts with the
motive of avoiding accommodation may violate Title VII even if he has
no more than an unsubstantiated suspicion that accommodation would
be needed.”57 Stated even more clearly: “An employer may not make an
applicant’s religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in
employment decisions.”58
53.

Id.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at 2032.

56.

Id.

57.

Id. at 2033.

58.

Id. Justice Alito concurred in the result, disagreeing with the majority
largely on the question of whether an employer’s knowledge of the
religious nature of the applicant’s observance was an element of the
offense:
I would hold that an employer cannot be held liable for taking an
adverse action because of an employee’s religious practice unless
the employer knows that the employee engages in the practice for
a religious reason. If § 2000e-2(a)(1) really “does not impose a
knowledge requirement,” it would be irrelevant in this case
whether Abercrombie had any inkling that Elauf is a Muslim or
that she wore the headscarf for a religious reason. That would be
very strange.
Id. at 2035 (Alito, J., concurring). However, plaintiff need not show that
the employer took the adverse action because of the religious nature of
the practice. Id. at 2036. An employer risked liability if it declined to hire
anyone who refused to work on Saturday when the applicant’s refusal
“was known by the employer to be based on religion.” Id. In such a case,
the applicant was “rejected because of a religious practice.” Id.
Justice Alito then rejected the majority’s statement that the plaintiff has
the burden to prove a failure to accommodate. He argued that position
“blatantly contradicts the language of the statutes,” id., which require the
employer to “demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
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The majority apparently rejected any separate Title VII claim for
a failure to accommodate under § 703: subsections (1) and (2), “often
referred to as the ‘disparate treatment’ (or ‘intentional discrimination’)
provision and the ‘disparate impact’ provision, are the only causes of
action under Title VII.”59 Rather, such claims must be folded into the
normal analysis. The notion that there is no distinctive claim for a
failure to accommodate was reinforced by Justice Thomas’s separate
opinion, which noted that “[t]he Court today rightly puts to rest the
notion that Title VII creates a freestanding religious-accommodation
claim.”60
Justice Scalia, however, also stressed the difference between
religious discrimination claims and those based on other protected
classes. While disparate treatment on any prohibited ground is barred,61
only religious practices must be accommodated:
[T]he statute [does not] limit disparate-treatment claims to only
those employer policies that treat religious practices less favorably
than similar secular practices. . . . Title VII does not demand
mere neutrality with regard to religious practices—that they be
to [the] employee’s or prospective employee’s religious . . . practice . . .
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business,” id.
(emphasis omitted) (second alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(j) (2012)).
59.

Id. at 2032 (majority opinion).

60.

Id. at 2041 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Thomas’s opinion, however, faulted the majority for “creat[ing] in its
stead an entirely new form of liability: the disparate-treatment-based-onequal-treatment claim.” Id. (alteration in original). Justice Thomas
reasoned that disparate treatment under Title VII required an intent to
treat individuals differently on the basis of a protected class. Id. at 2039.
When all are treated the same, there can be no discrimination. Id. The
reasonable accommodation language of § 701(j) merely required an
employer to accommodate religious workers if it accommodated other
workers, thus violating the equal treatment command:
I do not dispute that a refusal to accommodate can, in some
circumstances, constitute intentional discrimination. If an employer
declines to accommodate a particular religious practice, yet
accommodates a similar secular (or other denominational)
practice, then that may be proof that he has “treated a particular
person less favorably than others because of [a religious practice].”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577
(2009)).

61.

Id. at 2033–34 (majority opinion) (“[R]eligious practice is one of the
protected characteristics that cannot be accorded disparate treatment and
must be accommodated.”). The sentence is odd since religion is the only
protected characteristic that “must be accommodated.” See id.; 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j) (2012).
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treated no worse than other practices. Rather, it gives them
favored treatment, affirmatively obligating employers not “to fail
or refuse to hire or discharge any individual . . . because of such
individual’s” “religious observance and practice.”62

By way of example, Scalia noted that, while employers are “surely
entitled” to regulate the headwear of their workers, a refusal to hire an
applicant who requires an accommodation to that policy may not be
permissible: “Title VII requires otherwise-neutral policies to give way
to the need for an accommodation.”63
Thus, there may be only one individual disparate treatment claim
under the statute, but it is subject to different proof where religion is
concerned. A male claiming sex discrimination would have no disparate
treatment claim if subject to a neutral headgear rule that he opposed
as inconsistent with his gender.64
The significance of the rejection of a separate claim for a failure to
accommodate while continuing to recognize a greater duty than would
be true for other protected characteristics is unclear. It may be that the
Court did not mean to repudiate the circuit court authority that
established different proof structures for plain vanilla discrimination
claims and failure-to-accommodate claims. After all, a complaint
seeking relief for a failure to hire because, say, the plaintiff is Jewish (a
discrimination simplicter claim) will be litigated considerably diff–
erently than a complaint seeking relief for a similar plaintiff who was
denied an accommodation so she could observe Shabbos.65 In the former,
the central dispute is likely to be whether the employer discriminated
on the ground of religion or some alternative “legitimate nondisc–
riminatory reason,” while in the latter, the central dispute is likely to
be whether allowing the employee time off from work from sundown
Friday to sundown Saturday is reasonable and not an undue hardship
in light of the employer’s business interests and possible need for
replacement workers. While Abercrombie indicated that the two claims
merge when a job is denied in order to avoid an accommodation,

62.

Id. at 2034 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012)).

63.

Id. This language is in some tension with the narrow scope that Trans
World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison accorded the duty of accommodation. See
432 U.S. 63, 79, 81 (1976). The Abercrombie majority failed to even cite
Hardison. See generally Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. 2028.

64.

See, e.g., Allison T. Steinle, Note, Appearance and Grooming Standards
as Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, 56 Cath. U. L. Rev. 261, 277–
78 (2006).

65.

Krizhner v. PurePOWER Techs., LLC, No. CA 3:12-1802-MBS, 2013 WL
5332686, at *4, *10 (D.S.C. Sept. 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment
for the employer on plaintiff’s claim that the employer failed to accommodate
his desire to observe Shabbat), aff’d, 566 F. App’x 239 (4th Cir. 2014).
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examples of cases involving one or the other kind of violation are not
far to seek.66
Most obviously, some plain vanilla discrimination cases rise from
sheer animus towards certain religions, apparently unconnected with
any need to accommodate religious practices.67 Many of the religious
harassment claims by Muslims in the last few years seem to be of that
variety: the problem is not with making adjustments in work schedules
to accommodate their religious observances but rather with resentments
about the mere presence of Muslims in the workplace.68
In short, the litigation for alleged violations of Title VII’s prohib–
ition of religious discrimination is almost certain to take different paths
depending on the conduct at issue, the Supreme Court notwith–
standing.69

II. The Grudging Duty of Religious Accommodation
Relatively soon after § 701(j) was added to the statute, the
Supreme Court addressed the accommodation duty in an opinion that
narrowly constrained that section’s reach. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
66.

For an example of an accommodation claim, see EEOC v. Ithaca Indus.,
Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 117–18 (4th Cir. 1988); for an example of a deniedaccommodation claim, see Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 975 F. Supp.
1055, 1057–58 (N.D. Ill. 1997), aff’d, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998).

67.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Spencer Press of Me., Inc., 364 F.3d 368, 373–74 (1st
Cir. 2004) (discussing defendant’s inappropriate, lewd, and derogatory
comments regarding the plaintiff’s religion and inability to work overtime
on Sundays).

68.

See, e.g., EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 311 (4th Cir.
2008) (holding that the severe and pervasive harassment of Muslim
plaintiff, which included “a steady stream of demeaning comments and
degrading actions” (including “religiously charged epithets” such as
“Taliban” and “towel head”), was actionable religious harassment).
Disentangling the religious objection from what might be viewed as
national origin or even racial discrimination is sometimes difficult given
current geopolitical realities. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018);
Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2016);
Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (discrimination
against an employee based on his Arab ancestry is race discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)).

69.

See generally Bruce N. Cameron & Blaine L. Hutchison, Thinking Slow
About Abercrombie v. Fitch: Straightening Out the Judicial Confusion in
the Lower Courts, 46 Pepp. L. Rev. 471, app. I at 483, 505–07 (2019)
(identifying a number of cases that continue to use the “the former prima
facie” formulation for accommodation claims); id. at app. II, at 508–09
(reporting decisions that modify that test to account for Abercrombie’s
elimination of any request-for-accommodation requirement). The authors
argue for an application of the McDonnell Douglas standard. Id. at 494,
app. II at 508.
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v. Hardison70 involved a Sabbatarian who asked his employer to modify
a shift schedule that would otherwise require him to work on Saturdays.
Doctrine under the ADA separates the question of whether an
accommodation is reasonable to begin with from the question of
whether it is an undue hardship and assigns the burdens of persuasion
separately on the two issues.71 The Supreme Court has since carried this
bifurcation over to § 701(j).72 Hardison, however, did not clearly
differentiate between the two concepts although it spoke most clearly
in terms of undue hardship.73 In any event, the Court had no difficulty
holding that the various proposed accommodations were not required.
The first issue the Court addressed was whether Trans World
Airlines (“TWA”) was required to violate a governing collective barg–
aining agreement in order to accommodate Hardison’s inability to work
on Saturday.74 It held no,75 a decision consistent with the Court’s later
holding to the same effect under the ADA in US Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett,76 which viewed such a step as unreasonable in the first place,
and, therefore, it never reached the undue-hardship question.77 Hard–
70.

432 U.S. 63 (1977).

71.

In US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002), the Court approved
the lower courts’ burden-shifting framework under which plaintiffs have
the burden of showing an accommodation that “seems reasonable on its
face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases. . . . Once the plaintiff has made
this showing, the defendant/employer then must show special (typically
case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the
particular circumstances.” See id. at 401–02.

72.

See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 n.2
(“The concurrence mysteriously concludes that it is not the plaintiff’s
burden to prove failure to accommodate. But of course that is the
plaintiff’s burden, if failure to hire ‘because of’ the plaintiff’s ‘religious practice’
is the gravamen of the complaint. . . . ‘The clause that begins with the
word “unless,”’ as the concurrence describes it, has no function except to
place upon the employer the burden of establishing an ‘undue hardship’
defense.”) (citations omitted) (quoting id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring));
cf. id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The clause that begins with the
term ‘unless’ unmistakably sets out an employer defense. If an employer
chooses to assert that defense, it bears both the burden of production and
the burden of persuasion. A plaintiff, on the other hand, must prove the
elements set out prior to the ‘unless’ clause, but that portion of the rule
makes no mention of accommodation.”).

73.

See generally Hardison, 432 U.S. 63.

74.

Id. at 67–68, 75–76.

75.

Id. at 79–81.

76.

535 U.S. 391 (2002). The ADA lacks Title VII’s exception for bona fide
seniority systems, which the Hardison Court cited as supporting its
conclusion. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81–82.

77.

See Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401–02, 406.
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ison was not so precise in its analysis, but it left no doubt that
employers are not required to provide accommodations that violate
collective bargaining agreements.78
While some workarounds might have accommodated Hardison
while leaving the collective bargaining agreement intact, the Court
concluded that each of the plaintiff’s alternatives amounted to an
“undue hardship” under an astonishingly deferential definition: “To
require TWA to bear more than a de minimis cost in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off is an undue hardship.”79 While it is not
surprising that requiring TWA to pay workers premium rates to fill-in
for Hardison violated that test, the Court went further to strongly
suggest that any favoring of Hardison’s religious needs over coworkers
with strong but nonreligious shift preferences was itself impermissible:
Title VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment. The
repeated, unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the
legislative history of Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in
employment, and such discrimination is proscribed when it is
directed against majorities as well as minorities. . . . It would be
anomalous to conclude that by “reasonable accommodation”
Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job
preference of some employees, as well as deprive them of their
contractual rights, in order to accommodate or prefer the religious
needs of others, and we conclude that Title VII does not require
an employer to go that far.80

The Court continued:
Like abandonment of the seniority system, to require TWA to
bear additional costs when no such costs are incurred to give other
employees the days off that they want would involve unequal
treatment of employees on the basis of their religion. By
suggesting that TWA should incur certain costs in order to give
Hardison Saturdays off the Court of Appeals would in effect
require TWA to finance an additional Saturday off and then to
choose the employee who will enjoy it on the basis of his religious
beliefs. While incurring extra costs to secure a replacement for
Hardison might remove the necessity of compelling another
employee to work involuntarily in Hardison’s place, it would not
change the fact that the privilege of having Saturdays off would
be allocated according to religious beliefs.81

78.

See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 79, 83 & n.14.

79.

Id. at 84.

80.

Id. at 81.

81.

Id. at 84–85. The Court summarized:
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This decision, rendered over Justice Marshall’s dissent, which
Justice Brennan joined,82 went far to restrict the duty of reasonable
accommodation.83 Although one might wonder whether Abercrombie’s
studied avoidance of limitations on the duty to accommodate signaled
some doubt on the question,84 Hardison remains an extraordinarily
grudging interpretation of the statute.
The Court’s antitextual reading seems to have resulted from the
tension it identified between the plain language of § 701(j) and the
statute’s overall equal-treatment goal,85 although it could easily have
found the duty of accommodation to be an explicit exception to the
statute’s more general nondiscrimination command. This led some
commentators to argue that Hardison’s strained interpretation was
driven by Establishment Clause concerns should Congress be held to
have imposed a too-robust duty to accommodate.86 The constitutional
[T]he paramount concern of Congress in enacting Title VII was
the elimination of discrimination in employment. In the absence
of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary,
we will not readily construe the statute to require an employer to
discriminate against some employees in order to enable others to
observe their Sabbath.
Id. at 85.
82.

Id. at 85–87 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The Court holds, in essence, that
although the EEOC regulations and the Act state that an employer must
make reasonable adjustments in his work demands to take account of
religious observances, the regulation and Act do not really mean what
they say. An employer, the Court concludes, need not grant even the most
minor special privilege to religious observers to enable them to follow their
faith. As a question of social policy, this result is deeply troubling, for a
society that truly values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of
minority religions to make the cruel choice of surrendering their religion
or their job. And as a matter of law today’s result is intolerable, for the
Court adopts the very position that Congress expressly rejected in 1972,
as if we were free to disregard congressional choices that a majority of this
Court thinks unwise.”).

83.

See id. at 81 (majority opinion) (explaining that reasonable
accommodations should not go so far as to deny an employer certain
rights); see also Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986)
(“We find no basis in either the statute or its legislative history for
requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable
accommodation. By its very terms the statute directs that any reasonable
accommodation by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation
obligation.”).

84.

See infra note 148.

85.

See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031–34
(2015).

86.

Some legislation favoring religion or particular religions has been held to
violate the Establishment Clause. Perhaps most on point is the Court’s
decision in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985), which
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question87 may be of more than academic interest given developments
that may portend a revision of Hardison.88 In the meantime, however,
Hardison’s restrictive approach to religious accommodations continues

struck down a Connecticut statute that prohibited employers from
requiring an employee to work on his Sabbath. See id. at 710–11. That
statute, however, was not limited to “reasonable” accommodations: it
required accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden
imposed. See id. at 709–10. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987),
the Court described the statute in Caldor as effectively having given “the
force of law to an employee’s designation of his Sabbath day and required
accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden that constituted
for the employer or other employees.” Id. at 337 n.15. Amos held that
Title VII’s exemption of certain religious employers from Title VII’s
prohibition of discrimination on account of religion, even if not required
by the Free Exercise Clause, did not violate the Establishment Clause.
See id. at 334–35.
Some commentators have explained Hardison as an effort by the Court
to avoid the issue it later faced in Caldor. See Pamela S. Karlan & George
Rutherglen,
Disabilities,
Discrimination,
and
Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 Duke L.J. 1, 6–7 (1996) (“Apparently to avoid
constitutional questions under the Establishment Clause, the Supreme
Court interpreted the duty of reasonable accommodation narrowly.”). But
see Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the
Religious Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 Tex. L.
Rev. 317, 402 n.373 (1997) (“[T]he Supreme Court in Hardison never
offered the Establishment Clause as a rationale for its decision.”). Perhaps
relevant to this debate is the fact that the Hardison dissenters went out
of their way to explain how the canon of avoidance did not justify the
majority’s decision. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 89–90 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court’s interpretation of the statute, by effectively
nullifying it, has the singular advantage of making consideration of
petitioners’ constitutional challenge unnecessary. The Court does not even
rationalize its construction on this ground, however, nor could it, since
‘resort to an alternative construction to avoid deciding a constitutional
question is appropriate only when such a course is “fairly possible” or
when the statute provides a “fair alternative” construction.’”) (quoting
Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 378 n.11 (1977)).
87.

Constitutional limits on what accommodation duties the government
might demand remain unclear; they may vary depending on the setting.
The government itself seems relatively free to accommodate free of
Establishment Clause concerns. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 329–30; Gonzales
v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439
(2006) (upholding a preliminary injunction against the federal
government’s enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act on religiousfreedom grounds when the sacramental use of hoasca was thereby
burdened). In the context of private employers, however, Caldor is as close
as the Court has come to deciding when a government-mandated
accommodation is permitted.

88.

See supra note 12 for possible developments in this regard.
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to govern Title VII cases.89 That means that many cases hold that a
proposed accommodation is not required because it would pose an
undue hardship for the employer.90

89.

See Laura E. Watson, Note, (Un)Reasonable Religious Accommodation:
The Argument for an Essential Functions Provision Under Title VII, 90
S. Cal. L. Rev. 47, 57–59 (2016).

90.

See, e.g., Yeager v. First Energy Generation Corp., 777 F.3d 362, 362–63
(6th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (holding that an employer need not
accommodate an employee’s religious beliefs by violating a federal
statute); Tagore v. United States, 735 F.3d 324, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that no accommodation—such as working from home or being
assigned elsewhere—was required for a Sikh who was fired because she
could not enter her IRS workplace as the length of her kirpan violated
federal office security rules); EEOC v. GEO Grp., Inc., 616 F.3d 265 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding that a prison need not accommodate female Muslim
guards’ religious-based desire to wear khimars when the prison’s policy
against headgear was justified by security concerns); Cloutier v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that an employer
was not required to accommodate plaintiff’s religious beliefs as a member
of the Church of Body Modification by allowing her to wear her facial
jewelry because doing so would be an undue hardship in terms of the
employer’s public image, even though there were no complaints and other
employees’ piercings went unnoticed); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
358 F.3d 599, 606–07 (9th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that it would be an undue
hardship to either permit plaintiff to post anti-gay scriptural passages
that demeaned co-workers or to exclude sexual orientation from the
employer’s workplace diversity program).
Similarly, when employers offer some accommodation, courts have
typically found them to be reasonable, thus pretermitting any exploration
of whether another accommodation would be better suited to the
employee’s requests. See, e.g., Telfair v. Fed. Express Corp., 567 F. App’x
681 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that employer’s offer to transfer employees
to lower-paid positions was a reasonable accommodation when reassigning
them to a different shift would have required them to work on their
Sabbath); Sánchez-Rodríguez v. AT&T Mobility P.R., Inc., 673 F.3d 1,
12–13 (1st Cir. 2012) (concluding that, taken together, the employer’s
offer of a different position, allowing plaintiff to swap shifts, and refraining
from disciplining him for absenteeism satisfied the employer’s statutory
obligations).
Where an employee’s preferred accommodation collides with a collective
bargaining agreement, courts typically find for the employer. See, e.g.,
Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Del., 285 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2002)
(holding that it was an undue hardship for trucking company to
accommodate a Christian truck driver who refused to make overnight runs
with female drivers because that accommodation would require the
employer to violate a collective bargaining agreement under which drivers
are dispatched in the order of seniority). Even where a collective
bargaining agreement does not control, courts have been reluctant to
require accommodations that burden co-workers. See, e.g., Bruff v. N.
Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001) (concluding that it
was an undue hardship to accommodate counselor’s religious beliefs by
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Nevertheless, Title VII’s duty is not without teeth. A number of
decisions have held in the employee’s favor, typically when relatively
minor accommodations address the religious concern, such as perm–
itting shift swaps91 or short-term absences.92 This is particularly true
when the proposed accommodation does not require any infringement
on co-workers’ interests.93

III. Title VII’s Prohibition of Retaliation
As discussed above, § 704 of Title VII bars employer retaliation
against an employee or applicant for both “opposing” unlawful employ–
ment practices and “participating” in proceedings under the statute.94
The reach of this provision was at issue in EEOC v. North Memorial
Health Care,95 in which the Eighth Circuit held that this language does

assigning to other counselors her patients who wished help involving
homosexual or extramarital relations).
Abercrombie’s effect on these decisions is another question. As we saw,
that opinion stressed that Title VII demands more than “mere neutrality”
with regard to religious practices and it used as an example an employer
favoring a religious worker by exempting her from a neutral rule barring
headwear. See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also Abercrombie,
135 S. Ct. at 2034. Abercrombie, however, did not address or even cite
Hardison.
91.

Permitting voluntary shift swaps is often a reasonable accommodation.
See Sánchez-Rodríguez, 673 F.3d at 12–13 (1st Cir. 2012); Patterson v.
Walgreen Co., 727 F. App’x 581 (11th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
No. 18-349, Sept. 14, 2018. However, the extent to which such an offer
actually accommodates the religious worker depends on the availability of
volunteers and the employer’s response when a shift cannot be negotiated.
See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, Religious Accommodation in the Workplace:
Why Federal Courts Fail to Provide Meaningful Protection of Religious
Employees, 20 Tex. Rev. L. & Pols. 107 (2015).

92.

EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576–77, 1583 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that employer violated its accommodation duty by not
rescheduling Jewish workers for Yom Kippur); see also Adeyeye v.
Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 455–56 (7th Cir. 2013)
(concluding that employer failed to show that allowing worker to take
several weeks of unpaid leave would have caused it an undue hardship
when there was high turnover of workers).

93.

See Kaminer, supra note 91, 141–43.

94.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment
practice for any employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”).

95.

908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018).

400

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Retaliation and Requesting Religious Accommodation

not categorically reach an applicant who is denied a job because she
requested an accommodation for her religious observance.96
The case began with an application for a hospital’s residency
program by Emily Sure-Ondara, a Seventh Day Adventist.97 She
received what the court described as a “conditional offer of employ–
ment”98 as a nurse, after which she first raised her “need [for] Friday
nights off for Sabbath rest,” telling the hospital that “I don’t work
Fridays.”99 After some back-and-forth between Sure-Ondara and the
hospital, the hospital ultimately denied her accommodation request.100
It insisted that work on alternate weekends was required by the
governing collective bargaining agreement; Sure-Ondara responded that
she needed the job and “would ‘make it work’ by finding a substitute
for her Friday night shift or come in herself in an emergency or life-ordeath situation.”101 Ultimately, however, the hospital rescinded its job
offer because it concluded that Sure-Ondara would not be able to swap
shifts (Friday nights being unpopular) and “she would only show up for
what she considered emergencies.”102 Although there was some
unsuccessful effort by the hospital to find her another position, SureOndara filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which ultim–
ately brought suit on her behalf.103
Although there was a plausible argument that North Memorial had
violated § 703 by denying Sure-Ondara employment on the basis of her
religion,104 the Commission sued only on the basis of § 704, claiming
96.

Id. at 1102.

97.

Id. at 1099.

98.

Id.

99.

Id. The court’s opinion seems to fault Sure-Ondara for not raising the
issue earlier in the process. See id. (“Despite learning that a registered nurse
working night shifts in the CACE Unit was required to work eight-hour
shifts every other weekend—terms and conditions established by North
Memorial’s collective bargaining agreement with the Minnesota Nurses
Association—Sure-Ondara did not disclose that her religion would prevent
her from working from sundown on Fridays to sundown on Saturdays.”).
The relevance of that is not clear, and few attorneys would advise an
applicant about either the need or wisdom of raising accommodation issues
before the employer has made its initial hiring decision.

100. See id. at 1100.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The hospital ultimately rescinded its offer because of the applicant’s need
for an accommodation, which fits squarely within the Abercrombie
formulation. Id. at 1100–01. This case, however, deals with a situation
not explicitly raised in Abercrombie: an employer who was not required
to accommodate. Even granting this, the hospital’s action could be char–
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that the hospital engaged in unlawful retaliation.105 Because any adverse
employment action against Sure-Ondara preceded her “participation”
in a Title VII proceeding by virtue of filing a charge, only the
“opposition” clause of the section was at issue, and the majority found
that her request for an accommodation was not protected.106 In doing
so, the court did not question that the nurse’s request for “a religious
accommodation was based on a good faith, objectively reasonable belief
that she was entitled to the requested accommodation.”107 Nevertheless,
she did not “oppose” any unlawful practice, and her request was,
therefore, not protected.108
The majority recognized that the Supreme Court in Crawford v.
Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County 109 had held
that the term oppose “carries its ordinary meaning,” and that any
communication to the employer that conveys a belief that the employer
has engaged in discrimination “virtually always constitutes opposition
to the activity.”110 Crawford also held that merely answering questions
in an internal investigation of sexual harassment could be opposition
conduct.111 Thus, the Court interpreted oppose very broadly. Never–
theless, the North Memorial majority found that the EEOC claim
foundered due to the fact that a request for accommodation does not
necessarily oppose any discrimination:
Sure-Ondara did not complain that North Memorial unlawfully
refused to accommodate. She requested an accommodation, and
acterized as discriminating against Sure-Ondara on the basis of her religion
since, although she requested an accommodation, she also indicated that
she would work without one, which seems to bring us back to
Abercrombie. See id. at 1099–1100. Her charge had asserted such a
violation, but why the EEOC did not pursue this claim in its suit on her
behalf isn’t clear. See id. at 1100.
105. The agency sought remedies for Sure-Ondara, “including injunctive relief
and backpay, compensatory, and punitive damages,” id. at 1100, which
raises its own questions. If Sure-Ondara was actually unwilling to perform
the position’s duties without an accommodation that would be found
unreasonable or an undue hardship, it is not clear why she should receive
backpay, much less instatement (the default form of injunctive relief in
Title VII cases). On the other hand, if she were willing to work even
absent an accommodation, why did not the EEOC also file suit based on
§ 703?
106. See id. at 1101, 1103.
107. Id. at 1103.
108. Id.
109. 555 U.S. 271 (2009).
110. Id. at 276.
111. Id. at 273.
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it is undisputed on this record that North Memorial’s nondiscriminatory practice was to consider such requests on a caseby-case basis. After she made the request and no mutually
acceptable accommodation was reached, Sure-Ondara’s Title VII
remedy as an unsuccessful job applicant was a disparate treat–
ment claim under [§ 703-2(a)] for failure to reasonably accom–
modate.112

The court concluded that, “[c]onsistent with the plain meaning of
the word ‘oppose,’ the initial request for a religious accommodation
simply does not ‘implicitly’ constitute opposition to the ultimate denial
of the requested accommodation.”113 It also noted that, prior to
Abercrombie, the EEOC had argued that Title VII created a cause of
action for a failure to accommodate, a theory that the Supreme Court
rejected in that case.114 Accordingly, the court reasoned that Aber–
crombie “precludes allowing the EEOC to repackage its rejected
interpretation of unlawful discrimination under [§ 703] as an unlawful
opposition-clause retaliation claim under [§ 704].”115
The majority recognized that a request for accommodation under
the ADA was protected activity under that statute, but it nevertheless
distinguished that statutory setting in a somewhat confusing passage.
It first noted that an ADA plaintiff must make a request for
accommodation,116 but whether such a request is a precondition to a
§ 703 suit under Title VII is an “open question after Abercrombie &
Fitch.”117 Nevertheless, the court viewed Title VII’s “express reference
to religious accommodation . . . as evidencing Congress’ intent to
protect requests for religious accommodation. But the fact that such a
request is ‘protected activity’ does not mean it is always ‘oppositional’
activity.”118 Apparently, sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t.
Trying to explain this distinction, the majority posited a hypo–
thetical employee who was fired for opposing a “foolish or ignorant”
policy of not accommodating religious practices.119 Such a person would
112. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1102.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 94–108.
117. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103. Why the court thought that is not so
clear since Elauf had not requested an accommodation and the Supreme
Court found the employer to have violated the statute by not hiring her.
See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2031,
2034 (2015).
118. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103.
119. Id.
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be protected. That would also be true, “if an employee or applicant in
good faith requested a religious accommodation, and if the employer
denied the accommodation on the ground that it was not in fact based
on a religious practice and fired or refused to hire the employee or
applicant because she made the request.”120 The court did not explain
why it matters, given that the adverse action is the same (the applicant
is not hired) whether the employer is retaliating because it does not
believe that the request was based on religion as opposed to whether it
believes the request cannot be reasonably accommodated without an
undue hardship.121
So far, whatever the merits of the majority’s opinion, it was
defensible as a textualist application of § 704. In the last paragraph of
the opinion, however, the court lost its way. The EEOC had accused
the hospital of unlawful retaliation in rescinding its conditional offer of
employment. The majority viewed this as “sophistry” since SureOndara “had the same right to religious accommodation as a job
applicant under § 2000e(j) with or without a conditional job offer.
Thus, rescinding that offer was not an adverse employment action.”122
This is head-scratching since denying a job is the quintessential adverse
employment action, and rescission of a job offer is the effective denial
of a job.
But the majority seemed to mean only that the denial, however
adverse, was not actionable: it noted evidence adduced by North
Memorial that it was “not feasible to hire an untrained Advanced
Beginner into a team providing Hospice and Palliative Care to elderly
patients if the applicant will not work the collectively bargained
schedule.”123 Thus there could be no violation of § 703 because “[t]here
is no duty to accommodate an applicant or employee by hiring or
transferring her into a position when she is unwilling or unable to
perform one of its essential job functions.”124 The point of the discussion
seemed to be that Sure-Ondara had suffered no legal wrong since she
wouldn’t have been hired in any event125: No harm, no foul.
Circuit Judge Grasz dissented. In light of the “Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation” of § 704 in Crawford and “the near-universal
consensus of circuit courts of appeals interpreting almost identical
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. The majority cited an ADA case, Faidley v. United Parcel Serv. of
Am., Inc., 889 F.3d 933, 941 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc), for that
unobjectionable proposition.
125. See North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103–04. The relationship between § 703
and § 704 claims is revisited in Part IV infra.
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statutory language” in the ADA,126 he would have found a request for
accommodation to be protected “opposition.” He began by noting that
the word oppose could have both narrow and broad meanings but that
the Court in Crawford had opted for “an expansive view of the
opposition clause, such that an individual does not need to directly or
overtly communicate opposition to an unlawful employment practice—
conduct or communication that reveals opposition, even implicitly, is
enough.”127 Key to the dissent were the following sentences: “Common
sense dictates that requesting a religious accommodation in most
circumstances communicates support for the grant of the request and
opposition to its denial. In other words, the request itself conveys
opposition to the employer’s failure to accommodate the applicant’s (or
employee’s) religion.”128
As for the ADA authority, the dissent noted that the Eighth Circuit
(like almost all other circuits) had found requests for disability
accommodations to be protected activity,129 and that “[u]nder general
principles of statutory interpretation, statutes in pari materia are to be
interpreted consistently and identical statutory language in related
statutes is to be given the same meaning unless context dictates
otherwise.”130 Further, Eighth Circuit authority had stated that
“[r]etaliation claims under the ADA are analyzed identically to those
brought under Title VII.”131 Although the dissent did not extensively
discuss the ADA authority, it included a laundry list of ADA circuitcourt decisions that all relied on the portion of that statute with
substantially identical language to Title VII rather than the ADA’s
broader “interference” clause.132
Having resolved the legal question in favor of protecting
accommodation requests as “opposition,” the dissent had little difficulty
finding that the EEOC’s claim should survive summary judgment.133
126. Id. at 1104 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1105. Supplementing this argument was the policy concern against
encouraging those requesting an accommodation to be more assertive in
doing so. See id. (“Moreover, adopting too high a standard for opposition
could have the unintended effect of forcing requesters to take a confront–
ational approach in order to be afforded Title VII’s protections against
retaliation.”).
129. Id. at 1104.
130. Id. (citing Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 170–73, 252–55 (2012)).
131. Id. (quoting Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir.
1999)).
132. See id. at 1105 & n.5.
133. Id. at 1106–07.
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The hospital’s withdrawal of its job offer was conceded to be materially
adverse,134 and the hospital’s supposed nonretaliatory reason135 could
not be credited on summary judgment.
The dissent concluded by noting that it shared the majority’s
“apparent concern that Title VII not be read so that meritless
discrimination claims based on a failure to accommodate may simply
be repackaged and resurrected as retaliation claims.”136 By “meritless,”
the majority was apparently referring to claims where the law required
no accommodation.137 In other words, the dissent recognized that a
permissible failure to accommodate should not be converted into an
actionable claim of retaliation but because of Title VII’s causation
requirement, not its opposition requirement:
In my view . . . it is the causation element that properly does the
work of weeding out such claims, not the opposition requirement.
Where an employer, after denying an accommodation request
that it is not legally obligated to grant, refuses to hire an
applicant because the applicant cannot or will not perform the
job without accommodation, the employer can show the
legitimacy of the action by evidence that the inability to perform
the job was the cause of the employer’s adverse action, rather
than retaliation for making the accommodation request.138

Unlike merely repackaged claims, the claim before the court should
survive “because there is evidence of retaliation, namely the evidence
that Sure-Ondara told North Memorial she would work the job even
without the accommodation and would show up for work if she could
not find a replacement.”139 In this setting, the hospital’s withdrawal of

134. Id. at 1106. Not every act of retaliation is proscribed by the statute;
rather, the retaliatory action must be sufficiently “adverse” to be
actionable, which means it must be serious enough to deter a reasonable
employee from engaging in protected conduct. See Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (“[T]he employer’s actions must
be harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”).
135. North Memorial claimed that it revoked the conditional job offer “because
it was legitimately and sincerely concerned that, if hired, Sure-Ondara
could not be counted on to work her designated shifts.” North Memorial,
908 F.3d at 1106 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1106–07.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1107.
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its job offer rendered it “reasonable for a fact-finder to infer that it did
so because she had requested an accommodation.”140

IV. Section 703 to the Rescue?
Although the case generated an amicus brief on behalf of a number
of organizations supporting religious liberty,141 the significance of North
Memorial, even should the majority’s interpretation be generally
adopted, is unclear. That is because § 703 might well provide sub–
stantial protection. If there is no corresponding § 703 claim, however,
North Memorial would effectively immunize employers from liability
should they retaliate against an employee or applicant for merely
requesting a non-legally required accommodation, thus opening a
gaping hole in the statute. To see this, imagine that the person seeking
an accommodation is a present employee, and the employer fires him
for making the request. Under the North Memorial majority’s analysis,
the employer would be liable only if it were obligated to accommodate,
and only under § 703.142 But the vulnerability to retaliation in this
setting might discourage even requests that could be reasonably
accommodated, thus undercutting a major thrust of the statute. The
majority’s limited examples of extreme instances when a retaliation
claim will nevertheless lie143 do little assuage that concern.
But perhaps § 703 provides a solution essentially mooting the
holding in North Memorial (which, recall, addressed only § 704).
Certainly, even if requests for accommodation are not protected, an
employee whose request should have been granted will have a claim

140. Id.
141. An amicus brief was filed on behalf of the General Conference of Seventhday Adventists, Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America,
Mid-American Union Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Christian
Legal Society, Minnesota Catholic Conference, American Civil Liberties
Union, American Jewish Community, and the ACLU of Minnesota. Amicus
Brief of the Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists et al. at 17, North
Memorial, 908 F.3d 1098 (8th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-2926).
142. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1103.
143. See supra notes 119–120 and accompanying text.
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under § 703, which makes the absence of a § 704 claim irrelevant for
such workers.144 This is the clear message of Abercrombie.145
The obvious response is that, given the grudging scope of the Title
VII accommodation duty, many, maybe most, requests can be legally
rejected by employers. But does that mean there is no liability under
§ 703 when an applicant who requests an accommodation is legally
denied one?
The answer is no. While an employer need not provide an
accommodation that is an undue hardship, it cannot refuse to offer
employment to an applicant who requests an accommodation. This is
the purport of Abercrombie, but it also makes sense in terms of believer
autonomy: the applicant should have a choice to accept the job without
accommodation if she so chooses. Note that, under this analysis, North
Memorial’s holding is largely irrelevant: while a request for
accommodation may or may not be a violation of § 704, denial of a job
to someone who requests an accommodation violates § 703 when that
is the basis of the denial. To avoid a violation, the employer must offer
the job sans accommodation (assuming it would otherwise have done
so), leaving it to the applicant to decide whether to accept
unaccommodated employment.
This is certainly consistent with the language of Abercrombie,
which declared that “[a]n employer may not make an applicant’s
religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment
decisions.”146 This passage is written broadly enough to embrace the
situation where Elauf, the plaintiff in Abercrombie, could be legally
denied her (supposed) accommodation request because it would be an
undue hardship. And this reading does not leave the statute without
meaning: Elauf might have chosen not to ask for an accommodation or
might have chosen to work even if one were (legally) refused;
Abercrombie & Fitch’s action preempted her choice.
144. The amicus brief, however, pointed out that in the ADA context, the First
and Third Circuits had noted the possibility of gaming the system: “if
seeking an accommodation were not protected activity, an employer could
temporarily grant an accommodation, then quickly fire the employee.”
Amicus Brief, supra note 141, at 17 (citing Shellenberger v. Summit
Bancorp, 318 F.3d 183, 191 (3d Cir. 2003); Soileau v. Guilford of Me.,
Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997)). There would, arguably, then be no
discrimination claim for failure to accommodate and no retaliation claim.
The persuasiveness of this argument, however, is doubtful. In both the
disability and the religion contexts, an employee’s discharge could easily
be viewed as being related to her protected characteristic. Indeed, it fits
perfectly into Abercrombie’s description of a § 703 claim arising when an
employer acts because it must accommodate a religious practice. See
EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033 (2015).
145. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2031.
146. Id. at 2033.
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As for believer autonomy, Elauf was denied both the chance that
the accommodation she (may have) sought would be required by Title
VII and the option to work without being accommodated if granting it
would have been an undue hardship. As for Sure-Ondara, the plaintiff
in North Memorial, she was denied the job she apparently needed, and
one which her religious convictions apparently permitted her to
perform.147
In response, it might be argued that the Abercrombie Court did not
specifically address whether an employer would violate § 703 by
refusing to hire someone when: (1) the applicant’s religion effectively
disabled her from performing the job in question; and (2) the statute
did not require the requested accommodation.148 And, at least where
the applicant would not accept the position if she was not
accommodated, the employer’s refusal to hire inflicts no tangible harm.
That is true but it misses the point. First, it shifts the employment
decision from the applicant to the employer, which is inconsistent with
Abercrombie.149 Second, Title VII’s “motivating factor” liability also
reaches situations where there is no but-for causation because the
employer establishes that it would have reached the same decision in

147. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
148. The majority’s failure to expressly deal with this possibility might be
traced to an apparently innocuous footnote in the opinion: “For brevity’s
sake, we will in the balance of this opinion usually omit reference to the
§ 2000e(j) ‘undue hardship’ defense to the accommodation requirement,
discussing the requirement as though it is absolute.” Abercrombie, 135 S.
Ct. at 2032 n.1.
149. See id. at 2032.
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any event.150 That seems to capture precisely the situation above.151 In
other words, the employer may be able to show that the religious
observer would not have taken the job because she would have refused
to perform it without the accommodation, thus establishing the same
result in any event. But the employer would nevertheless have violated
§ 703’s motivating-factor test by withholding an offer because of the
applicant’s religion.
The oddity in this analysis is that it seems to provide meaningful
protection only for those who request an accommodation that they do
not “need,” in the sense that they are willing to work even if the
accommodation is denied. Some might even argue that this scenario
casts doubt on the applicant’s sincerity in requesting the
accommodation to begin with.152
That would be a mistake. Requesting an accommodation that is
not absolutely necessary, in the sense that the applicant’s beliefs do not
prevent her from taking the job if not accommodated, is apparently not

150. Section 703(m), added by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, provides:
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.
Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 107(a), § 703(m), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(m) (2012)). Although liability attaches
when a motivating factor operates, Congress simultaneously amended the
statute to provide a limited affirmative defense: should defendant carry a
burden of persuasion that it would have reached the same decision even
had the illicit “motivating factor” not been present, the plaintiff’s remedies
are severely restricted. Id. sec. 107(b)(3), § 706(g)(2)(B), 105 Stat. 1071,
1075–76 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012)).
See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little?: Why
“Motivating Factor” Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 Ariz.
L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020); Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:
Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 911,
932–38 (2005) (analyzing the evolution of employment discrimination law
and mixed-motives cases).
151. If the employer legally denies the accommodation but continues to offer
the job to the applicant, there will be no violation of the statute: the loss
of employment is the result of the applicant’s choice, not the employer’s
violation of any legal duty.
152. See, e.g., Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 14,
United States v. Ozaukee County, No. 2:18-cv-00343, 2018 WL 6304888
(E.D. Wis. June 11, 2018) (arguing that “[t]he fact that [Plaintiff] chose
her job over her beliefs by acceding to” behavior that arguably did not
conform with her religion after being denied an accommodation “supports
a finding of insincerity”), dismissed, No. 2:18-cv-00343, 2019 WL 2291514
(E.D. Wis. May 3, 2019).
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an unusual situation.153 Arguably, that was the case in North Memorial:
Sure-Ondara indicated she was willing to work despite the absence of
an accommodation. It is true that at least some courts have suggested
that the duty of accommodation reaches only practices that are
religiously required.154 That intuition may stem from the fact that the
accommodation duty is sometimes framed in terms of relieving believers
from having to choose between their jobs and their creeds, casting as
disingenuous those requesting an accommodation if they are willing to
work without it.
But the statute does not say that a religious practice or
observance must be “compelled” to be accommodated.155 In fact,
the notion of “required” religious observances reflects a very cramped
view of religion since many religions are less commandment-oriented
than the Judeo-Christian tradition.156 Other courts have rejected any

153. See cases cited infra note 157.
154. See Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he
issue here is whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact
whether Davis sincerely felt that she was religiously compelled to attend
and participate in a special service at church . . . .”) (emphasis added).
Some cases speak in terms of “required” or “compelled” religious practices
but focus on whether the practices are “religious” to begin with. See
Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444, 451 (7th Cir. 2013)
(reasoning that plaintiff presented sufficient evidence for a jury to find
that his attendance at burial rites for his father was religious in nature
rather than only “a filial duty that Title VII does not recognize or
protect”).
155. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012) (defining religion as including “all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,” and not just aspects
that are compelled).
156. See, e.g., The Seven Principles, Unitarian Universalist Ass’n,
https://www.uua.org/beliefs/what-we-believe/principles [https://perma.cc/
N7M4-K86Q] (last visited Sept. 28, 2019) (setting out the principles of
Unitarian Universalist congregations as a “guide” rather than “dogma or
doctrine”).
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requirement that the observance or practice be required or central,157
and that seems more consistent with the general reluctance of secular
courts to decide questions of religious doctrine.158 Further support for
rejecting such a view comes from the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, both
of which protect religious practices and beliefs, regardless of whether
they are compelled.159 Generally speaking, “religious liberty” can
157. E.g., Heller v. EBB Auto Co., 8 F.3d 1433, 1438–39 (9th Cir. 1993)
(allowing a claim for failure to accommodate an employee’s attendance at
his wife’s conversion ceremony and further noting that a court should not
inquire whether a particular practice is mandated or prohibited by a
religion because that would involve deciding religious questions); Redmond v.
GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900–01 (7th Cir. 1978) (attendance at a Bible
study class is protected because all “aspects of religious observance and
practice” are protected (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012))); Cooper v.
Gen. Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163, 168 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that, barring
an undue hardship to the employer, “[i]f the employee’s conduct is
religiously motivated, his employer must tolerate it”); Reyes v. N.Y. State
Office of Children & Family Servs., No. 00 Civ. 7693(SHS), 2003 WL
21709407, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003) (“Title VII protects more than
the observance of Sabbath or practices specifically mandated by an
employee’s religion.”).
158. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733 (1872) (declining to resolve
a property dispute between competing church factions); Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94,
116 (1952) (declaring that churches should be free from state interference
in deciding “matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine”).
159. “The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2012). This definition, found in the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), was adopted by reference
for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) when RLUIPA was
passed. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-274, § 7(a)(3), 114 stat. 803, 806; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb2(4) (2012). The original text of RFRA merely defined the “exercise of
religion” as “the exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the
Constitution.” Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
103-141, § 5(4), 107 stat. 1488, 1489; see also Douglas Laycock, RFRA,
Congress, and the Ratchet, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 145, 151 (1995) (“Congress
rejected the view that only religious compulsion is protected. In committee
hearings, lobbyists offered amendments to change to a compulsion
standard, but those amendments went nowhere.”).
Of course, one could argue that RLUIPA’s language reflects a perceived
need to expand prior protections rather than confirming what earlier
statutes may have meant. Nevertheless, the Court has often stressed the
inappropriateness of the judiciary assessing religious claims beyond testing
the sincerity of such views. E.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“[C]ourts must not presume to
determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility
of a religious claim.”); Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)

412

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
Retaliation and Requesting Religious Accommodation

certainly reach religious practices that do not rise to the level of
religious mandates.160
In short, an applicant or employee can ask for an accommodation
while not “needing” it to remain employed, and such a request does not
necessarily raise questions about her sincerity.161 In North Memorial
itself, Sure-Ondara’s beliefs were apparently more nuanced than they
at first appeared. According to an amicus brief submitted in part on
behalf of Seventh-day Adventist governing bodies, rest on the Sabbath
“is near the center of what it means to be a Seventh-day Adventist.”162
However, the religion also highly values “the relief of human suffering
and care for the sick . . . values that go back to the ministry of Jesus
Christ.”163 As a result, “Adventist hospitals and healthcare workers
balance this biblical good of healing with Sabbath observance by not

(“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular
beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretations of those creeds.”). See generally Derek L. Gaubatz,
RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of
RLUIPA’s Prisoner Provisions, 28 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 501, 522–
29 (2005) (arguing that requiring religious activity be compelled is
contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent but noting a number of lowercourt cases that imposed such a requirement under RFRA (as originally
enacted)). Accordingly, the provisions of RFRA and RLUIPA to this
effect are best viewed as declarative of a constitutional requirement rather
than a mere statutory command.
160. Admittedly, such a view expands the universe of potential
accommodations and therefore poses more of a burden on employers, even
under the current grudging approach to what is required.
161. While there can be no inquiry into the rationality of a particular belief, a
court can determine whether the asserted belief is sincerely held. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Unión Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y
Alcantarillados de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 56–57 (1st Cir. 2002) (reversing
summary judgment for the EEOC where the sincerity of a claimed
Seventh-day Adventist was challenged by evidence of his conduct contrary
to the tenets of his professed religious belief). Nevertheless, there are very
few cases successfully challenging an employee’s sincerity. See Tagore v.
United States, 735 F.3d 324, 325–26, 328 (5th Cir. 2013) (reversing
summary judgment and holding that, despite arguments that a slightly
shorter blade length would satisfy plaintiff’s religion, there was a genuine
issue of material fact on the sincerity of Tagore’s practice of wearing a
kirpan with a three-inch blade). See generally Nathan S. Chapman,
Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 1185 (2017)
(explaining the sincerity requirement in the law of religious
accommodations and arguing for its continued viability). But see Cameron
& Hutchinson, supra note 69, at 498–99 (arguing that inquiry into
sincerity is impermissible).
162. Amicus Brief, supra note 141, at 27.
163. Id. at 28.
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doing unnecessary work that day.”164 That meant that Sure-Ondara’s
request for an accommodation was not inconsistent with her later
willingness to work on Fridays if such work proved necessary. Such a
principle seems applicable to a wide range of accommodation requests
from adherents to any number of religions.
This interpretation of Title VII largely moots the holding in North
Memorial, but it raises two questions. The first is the possible chilling
effect on believers of a rule under which requests for accommodation
are not protected from employer retaliation. The countervailing
textualist positions are well set out in both the majority and the
dissent,165 but the Supreme Court has not always been as relentlessly
textualist as it has sometimes been recently. For example, while § 704
does not by its terms apply to former employees, the Court has held
retaliation against them to be impermissible.166 More generally, the
Court has held that retaliation for opposing discrimination falls within
the prohibition of discrimination itself under several statutes even
without specific language to that effect.167 In short, it would not be
unprecedented to find requests for accommodation protected under the
statute even if they do not fit neatly into a court’s interpretation of
opposition. The North Memorial dissent’s reading is at most a short
step away from textualism, and certainly within the outer bounds
Crawford’s broad reading of opposition.168
The second question this interpretation of Title VII raises is how
§ 703 would apply in a case such as Sure-Ondara’s or in other situations
164. Id. at 29.
165. EEOC v. N. Mem’l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1101 & n.2 (8th Cir.
2018) (textualist argument for the majority); id. at 1104 (Grasz, J.,
dissenting) (textualist argument for the dissent).
166. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
167. E.g., CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 446, 452–53 (2008)
(noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits not only racial discrimination but
also retaliation against those who oppose such discrimination); GómezPérez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 479 (2008) (prohibiting retaliation against
federal employees asserting ADEA rights under the ADEA’s federalemployee provisions, which explicitly reach only age discrimination);
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U.S. 167, 173, 179 (2005)
(prohibiting retaliation against those asserting Title IX rights under Title
IX’s bar on sex discrimination); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396
U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that retaliation against those asserting 42
U.S.C. § 1982 rights against race discrimination is prohibited by that
provision). But see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,
356–57 (2013) (concluding that Title VII’s retaliation provision requires a
higher standard of causation than the Title’s status protections given
differences in statutory language).
168. See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 555 U.S. 271,
276–78 (2009).
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where a request for an accommodation raises doubts in the employer’s
mind about the employee’s willingness to perform if the accommodation
is not forthcoming. Recall that Sure-Ondara said that, absent shift
swaps, she would work in “an emergency or [a] life-or-death
situation.”169 That, quite naturally, gave rise to concerns by the hospital
as to whether she would make her own determinations about what
counted as a sufficient reason to work. Even the dissent seemed to think
that North Memorial should be exonerated if the jury credited its claim
that it revoked the conditional job offer “because it was legitimately
and sincerely concerned that, if hired, Sure-Ondara could not be
counted on to work her designated shifts.”170
But, of course, such doubts could arise only from Sure-Ondara’s
original request for an accommodation and what the hospital viewed as
insufficient assurances that she would work even if denied it.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to have been much development of
this between the employer and the applicant, but it would seem that,
given Abercrombie, the hospital would be required to accept sufficiently
concrete assurances by an applicant that she would perform the duties
of the position.171 While the hospital could discharge an employee for
not working when required, it cannot assume that an employee’s
religious practices and beliefs will preclude her from working those
shifts.172 This is where the ADA’s interactive process requirement would
prove helpful. Whether Sure-Ondara’s statements were sufficiently
concrete seems to be a question of fact.173
169. North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1100.
170. Id. at 1106–07 (Grasz, J., dissenting).
171. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2033
(2015) (explaining that an employer violates Title VII when acting on an
“unsubstantiated suspicion” that accommodation would be needed). See
also North Memorial, 908 F.3d 1098, 1106–07 (8th Cir. 2018) (Grasz, J.,
dissenting) (“Where an employer [denies] an accommodation request that
it is not legally obligated to grant, . . . the employer can show the
legitimacy of the action by evidence that the inability to perform the job
was the cause of the employer’s [decision], rather than retaliation for
making the accommodation request.”).
172. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033 (2015) (“If the applicant actually
requires an accommodation . . . and the employer’s desire to avoid the
prospective accommodation is a motivating factor in his decision, the
employer violates Title VII.”).
173. See North Memorial, 908 F.3d at 1106 (Grasz, J., dissenting) (explaining
that Sure-Ondara repeatedly assured North Memorial that “she would
take the job even without the accommodation and would ‘make it work,’”
which should create a question of fact). The structure of the litigation
could be debated. While the plaintiff almost certainly has the burden of
showing that the employer fired or refused to hire a worker because it
believed she would not work without the requested accommodation which
was legally denied, at that point the employer should be required to show
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Conclusion
It is a troubling notion that requests for a religious accommodation
are unprotected under Title VII unless the requested accommodation is
mandated under the law—a possible reading of Abercrombie through
the North Memorial lens. If generally accepted, it would chill religious
employees from requesting any accommodation, especially since
Hardison’s narrow view of an employer’s accommodation duty means
that employers are often not legally required to grant the request.
Fortunately, the North Memorial opinion did not address the question
of whether denying a job to someone whose accommodation request was
legitimately turned down may violate § 703’s prohibition of status
discrimination, even if it does not violate Title VII’s prohibition of
retaliation under § 704. Nevertheless, the North Memorial result is
problematic on its own terms since it reflects an overly literal reading
of the statute, one that is contrary to several Supreme Court opinions.
Further, as the North Memorial dissent suggests, a request for an
accommodation may easily be interpreted as opposing an employer’s
failure to accommodate, and thus fit within even narrower views of
“opposition.”

that it had reasonable grounds for belief that the employee would not
work in that setting. Proof that the position was offered to an applicant
or that an employee refused to perform would suffice but sufficiently
concrete statements by the employee would also suffice. An interactive
process clarifying the employee’s plans would be helpful. What would not
be permissible is the assumption that the plaintiff would not work if not
accommodated merely because she requested an accommodation.
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